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Abstract
In the session initiation protocol (SIP), payments have been proposed as a way for vendors to obtain profit from
the services they provide. Payments in SIP have also been proposed for microbilling and even as a solution to
SPAM in VoIP systems. Although several proposals exist for making payments in SIP, they present some limitations
when we want to pay for access to real-time services: either they are not suitable for micropayments or they do
not consider security in the payment information exchanged. As a response to these limitations, we propose a
new SIP payment protocol, LP-SIP, that supports the payment according to different models like pay-per-time,
session-based, etc. It also performs payments in SIP efficiently and takes into account the secure exchange of
payment information, unlike other existing proposals. Thus, we provide a lightweight payment protocol that can
be used for the payment of real-time services.
1 Introduction
Many multimedia services rely on session initiation pro-
tocol (SIP) [1], which is a cornerstone of the next gen-
eration networking and IP multimedia subsystem. Some
of the most important real-time multimedia services
based on SIP are telephone calls, video conferencing,
Internet television, and instant messaging. Additionally,
some other new, innovative services such as using the
voice to compose e-mails, event notification, paying for
parking spaces, etc., are becoming steadily available
under this protocol.
As is usual on the Internet, multimedia service provi-
ders want to obtain profits from the services they provide
by SIP. There are two kind of solutions for charging
these services: those based on authentication, authoriza-
tion and accounting (AAA) infrastructures such as those
based on RADIUS [2], Diameter [3] or SIPA/SIPA+ [4]
and those based on SIP-based payment mechanisms such
as Fischl and Tschofenig’s proposal [5], SIMPA [6], SIP-
Coin [7], Fan’s et al. protocol [8], or Zhang’s et al. proto-
col [9]. In AAA infrastructures the charging process is
focused on the interaction between the vendor and pay-
ment provider (a client-server architecture) [5,10]. On
the hand, in SIP-based payment mechanisms the client is
involved directly in the transaction and exchanges pay-
ment information with the vendor (a peer-to-peer
architecture).
As stated in [5,10], the integration of payments in SIP
can suppose several advantages over AAA-based
mechanisms. First, the use of simpler pricing models that
avoid the complexity of AAA protocols [5,10], which are
less efficient for real-time and high available services
[10]. Second, the support of different payment models.
Third, scalability because there is no need to establish a
direct trust-relationship between the client and the ven-
dor. Furthermore, as there is no direct relationship, the
risk can be an acceptable to the client, since the amount
of money at risk is limited [5]. Finally, it overcomes the
high costs of traditional payment mechanisms that may
be suitable for a single payment during a transaction but
not when low value payments have to be made or when
the payment has to be made with a negligible delay.
The integration of payment information in SIP has two
additional advantages. First, the client can ascertain the
price of accessing the service during the session initiation,
which facilitates price discrimination and avoids the client
having to use other means to discover this information.
This also gives vendors the support of different business
models, which makes some vendors more attractive than
others [11]. Second, the client does not need additional
flows with the vendor or a payment system. The separa-
tion of the flows of payment process and session access
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supposes that the payment process has to generate some
payment information (token or receipt of payment) for
subsequent inclusion in the SIP session to confirm the
payment and for the SIP session to allow access [5]. With
the inclusion of all payment information in SIP the pay-
ment is made at the same time as the access and no addi-
tional flows are needed, which can also improve efficiency.
Some interesting solutions have been proposed with
the aim of supporting payments for multimedia services
based on SIP [5-9,12]. The main drawbacks of these
proposals are that they are either not suitable for micro-
payments or they do not consider the secure and effi-
cient exchange of payment information.
Another approach that we could have followed was
the integration of some of the existing protocols. How-
ever, this approach has two drawbacks: these micropay-
ment protocols do not consider the confidentiality of
the payment information exchanged and they use asym-
metric cryptography in the payment phase [13-16],
which is not suitable for real-time transactions due to
the computational costs of these operations.
A payment protocol that supports making the pay-
ment of real-time services based on SIP should satisfy
two main requirements. First, the protocol should be a
micropayment protocol since these kind of protocols
allow payments of (very) low value amounts [13,17,18]
and are characterized because they try to reduce the
number of asymmetric cryptographic operations, the
number of exchanges and the participation of third par-
ties [13,17-20]. Thus, the protocol can be used to make
payment of real-time services. Second, the incorporation
of payment in SIP should be based on the extensibility
mechanisms defined by this protocol [1,12,21] in order
to avoid high costs of development and SIP overheads,
that is, it should be based only on the introduction of
new headers, contents for the body of the messages and
tags [21].
In this article, we propose a new SIP extension for
making micropayments that satisfies all the require-
ments mentioned. We have also taken into account
other interesting features. First, apart from supporting
the payment for the whole session, we also support
additional payments while the session is in progress.
Thus, it is possible to make an initial payment for an
initial period and then additional payments so as to con-
tinue with the session without any interruption. For this
purpose, the payment protocol should be efficient.
Finally, our proposal guarantees that the exchange of
payment information is made in a secure way and offers
protection against forgery or double-spending.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 examines
background related to SIP and payment scenarios.
These scenarios are useful to derive the requirements
(defined in Section 3) to cover in SIP payment protocol.
In Sections 4 and 5, we describe in detail our payment
protocol for SIP, named LP-SIP, which is analyzed in
depth in Section 6. Section 7 analyzes related study. Sec-
tion 8 provides an in-depth comparison between SIP-
Coin and our proposal. Finally, Section 9 concludes the
article and introduces future study.
2 Background
This section describes some proposals in which LP-SIP
is based, namely, SIP [1], the model offer/answer [22]
and the provisional response acknowledgement
(PRACK) [23] method. Furthermore, in order to estab-
lish the requirements our proposal should satisfy, we
describe some possible scenarios for payments in SIP.
2.1 SIP
The SIP [1] is a protocol designed to help in the crea-
tion and management of multimedia sessions such as a
voice over IP call, a distributed conference, an instant
message conversation or, in general, every type of data
communication between peers, also called user agents.
2.1.1 Session set up
SIP uses a three-way protocol to carry out the session
set up, unlike other SIP functions that are based only on
the request-response pattern. The third message is used
as a reliability mechanism.
The three-way protocol works as depicted in Figure 1.
It starts when a user agent sends an INVITE request,
which contains a description of the type of session the
user wants to take part in, the media and ports to be
used and the codecs supported. This information is
described by means of the session description protocol
(SDP) [24]. As a response to the INVITE request, the
callee answers with a provisional response (100 Trying).
Next, the second provisional response (180 Ringing) is
used so that the caller can know that the user agent
contacted is running and trying to notify the callee.
When the user answers the call, the 200 (OK) response
code is sent to inform the acceptance of the call includ-
ing codecs and parts. When this response is received,
the caller ends the three-way protocol by an ACK mes-
sage. Finally, media transmission starts using the codecs
exchanged during the three-way protocol. Usually, this
transmission is made by using UDP. However, TCP or
TLS could be used when a higher level of security is
required.
2.1.2 Other functions
In SIP a session remains established until one of the
peers starts its termination by the BYE message. This
request can be sent at any moment during the session.
The interchange of messages is possible between the
peers throughout the session thanks to the instant mes-
saging facilities that SIP includes by MESSAGE and 200
(OK) messages.
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2.1.3 Extensibility
SIP offers different extensibility mechanisms - it is pos-
sible to define new headers, new address schemes to
support communication with new protocols and new
option tags to establish new parameters for headers.
The Require header defined in SIP can be used for
User Agent Clients (UACs) to indicate user agent ser-
vers the options expected.
2.2 Session negotiation based on the offer/answer Model
In this section, we introduce the different mechanisms
we can use to achieve an agreement on the attributes of
a session. First, we explain the basic offer/answer model
and, next, the PRACK method.
2.2.1 Offer/answer model
The offer/answer model [22] defines a mechanism that
allows two entities to agree on the attributes to use in a
multimedia session. This process uses SDP to reach the
agreement. According to this specification, a higher layer
protocol like SIP is needed for the offer/answer exchange.
In SIP the exchange of SDP descriptions is carried out
during session establishment.
2.2.2 PRACK
The PRACK method [23] is an extension of SIP that
allows peers to refine the offer/answer model by offering
additional possibilities for these exchanges.
This extension includes three messages: a 183 (Session
progress) provisional response, a PRACK and its corre-
sponding 200 (OK) response to the PRACK. The first
message is issued by the server side to indicate that a
PRACK-200 (OK) cycle is about to start. Then, the PRACK
and 200 (OK) messages let clients and servers exchange
offers and answers about the kind of media to be used in
the session. When the negotiation is finished, the server
issues the 200 (OK) response code to the INVITEmessage.
2.3 Use case scenarios
This section presents different types of scenarios that
our proposal tries to cover. These scenarios have been
used and mentioned in the literature as scenarios where
the use of payment in SIP is suitable. In fact, our use
case scenarios are a more detailed description of the
scenarios mentioned in [5-7,9,12,25]. All of them use
SIP to support the payment of real-time multimedia ser-
vices and try to show the different possibilities that
should be supported. It is important to point out that
other different scenarios could have chosen. Our goal
with these use case scenarios is twofold. On the one
hand, to facilitate the understanding of the proposal and
show when some of the features provided by the proto-
col could be used. Although the scenarios presented are
different, the features related to payment are similar
and, therefore, the scenarios could represent a wide
range of SIP-based real-time multimedia services that
require a payment.
2.3.1 Scenario 1. Preventing SPAM in VoIP Systems
In the same way that spam has proliferated in e-mail
systems, spam over the Internet telephony and instant
messaging is expected to become even more important.
The solution proposed in [5,12] to this problem is that
the first time a user receives an unsolicited call, the reci-
pient, before accepting it, requests a payment whose
amount is (very) small (micropayments), e.g., four cents.
When the payment is made, the call is answered and the
caller is included in a whitelist for future communica-
tions. Furthermore, the payment made by the caller
could be refunded, with the caller and the recipient
exchanging their roles. In the refund the recipient makes
the payment and the caller receives it.
2.3.2 Scenario 2. Real-time communications services in P2P
networks
Let us suppose that a company wants to offer language-
training services over a P2P network created for the pro-
vision of multimedia services. These services could be
provided by means of video, audio and/or instant mes-
sages [5]. A user can access these services by making a
payment. The services could be charged following a pay-
per-time or flat free model. There are also other models
Figure 1 SIP session set up. This figure shows the messages exchanged during the session set up process in SIP.
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that could be followed, such as pay-per-volume, session-
based or pay-as-you-watch [26].
If we suppose a pay-per-time model, the user would
make an initial payment to start the session and one
additional payment for each period of time (usually, this
period of time is short, between 10 s and 1 min) the
user is using the service. Thus, the user would pay only
for the time she uses the service. We could suppose the
initial payment could be one Dollar/Euro and each addi-
tional minute five cents. The user would be notified
some time before the time/data finishes and the pay-
ment should be made quickly to avoid session interrup-
tion. Thus, if the user spends 40 min in a session
training, 40 payments are made.
2.3.3 Scenario 3. VoIP (Voice messages and calls)
Let us suppose that a VoIP company provides a service
in which national calls are paid by a flat rate and other
additional services such as international calls and listen-
ing to voice messages by making a payment.
In the access to voice messages, the company charges
an initial amount for the establishment of the call, e.g.,
29 cents (Euros/Dollars) and a payment for each voice
message, e.g., 13 cents. Thus, if a user were to listen to,
e.g., three voice messages, she would have to make four
payments.
The establishment of international calls could work in
a similar way. The service provider could request an
initial amount for the establishment, e.g., 30 cents
(Euros/Dollars) and, after the establishment and before
the time/data paid is finished, 25 cents for each minute
or fraction. Thus, if a user established a call that lasted
4 min and 30 s, she would have to make six payments.
In this scenario, it is also important that payments are
made very quickly to avoid the interruption of the ses-
sion, once started.
3 Requirements for supporting payments in SIP
From the aforementioned use case scenarios and the
requirements established in previous proposals that
make payments in SIP [5-7,9,12,25], we can derive the
different requirements that should satisfy a lightweight
payment protocol for SIP. These requirements are (if a
requirement maps directly with a use case scenario we
identify it by the number of scenario between parenth-
esis. Otherwise, the requirement is a generic one derived
from previous proposals):
• Payment protocol based on extensibility mechan-
isms. The support of a payment protocol in SIP
should be based on the extensibility mechanisms of
SIP in order to facilitate the incorporation of pay-
ments to the current developments of SIP. This also
facilitates the acceptance of the solution.
• Different payment models. The vendor should be
able to support different payment models: time (sce-
narios 2 and 3), volume (scenarios 2 and 3) and ses-
sion-based charging (scenario 1) [5]. It could even
support the pay-as-you-watch model [26] in which
the session is initiated without any payment. Later,
once some content has been sent, a payment is
requested. The models supported should be indi-
cated together with payment information. Further-
more, we should provide the messages needed to
request the payment when necessary (scenarios 2
and 3).
• Additional payments. The vendor should be able to
receive incremental or additional payments [7]. That
is, the client could make an initial payment for a
part of the session instead of paying for the whole
session. Later, before the session finishes, if the user
is interested in it, she could make an additional pay-
ment. It is important to point out that this addi-
tional payment should be received without stopping
the session in progress (scenarios 2 and 3).
• Time/Data notification. The merchant should be
able to notify the customer that the time/data she
paid for is finishing. Thus, session interruption can
be avoided (scenarios 2 and 3) [7].
• Lightweight and efficient protocol. The payment pro-
tocol should allow the payment to be efficient by using
lightweight cryptography (mainly based on symmetric
cryptography instead of using asymmetric cryptogra-
phy) and avoiding additional connections to make the
payment, as well as the minimization of the participa-
tion of trusted third party (TTP) entities [5,7]. Thus,
the initiation of the session and the payment would be
performed quickly (all the three scenarios) and the
protocol would also make it more difficult for an inter-
ruption to occur when an additional payment is
requested (scenarios 2 and 3).
• Security in the payment process. The payment
information should be exchanged in such a way that
the confidentiality and integrity is guaranteed against
possible attackers. Furthermore, the protocol should
guarantee that any entity (clients, vendors, or exter-
nal attackers) cannot perform double spending with-
out being detected, nor generate bogus payments,
etc.
4 The LP-SIP protocol foundations
This section describes the foundations of the Light-
weight Payment SIP protocol that we propose, herein-
after, LP-SIP protocol. First, we describe the
participating entities. Then, we outline how the system
works, the different processes involved in LP-SIP and
the extensions we have made to SIP to support it.
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4.1 Roles
Three kinds of entities participate in the LP-SIP protocol:
clients, vendors, and brokers.
Clients are entities that want to access real-time services
and are willing to pay for them. Vendors (we could also
name them service providers) are the entities that provide
those real-time services based on SIP and charge clients
that want to access them. These services can be offered by
following different payment models such as pay-per-time,
pay-per-data, etc. Payments are made by using e-coins
that are minted by a broker.
A broker acts as a TTP and plays the role of financial
service provider between customers and vendors. This
role could be played by different kind of entities such as
a bank, a payment service provider, network service pro-
vider, a (mobile) network operator, an Internet Service
Provider, a multimedia application provider, etc. This
entity is responsible for registering clients and vendors,
minting e-coins for making payments, charging the user
for the e-money they withdraw, paying vendors from
the e-coins they deposit, and key management that
allows secure communications between clients and ven-
dors, so guaranteeing confidentiality, integrity and
authentication.
For the client and the vendor to perform a payment
transaction both entities have to be registered at the same
broker since each broker can only verify its own e-coins.
But this does not mean that they have only to work with
one broker since both client and vendor could be regis-
tered at different brokers. Thus, they can purchase/sell
real-time services to a broad number of vendors/clients,
respectively. We could compare it with a client owning
several credit cards from different companies and a vendor
supporting the payment with different credit card brands.
4.2 Overview
LP-SIP is based on the use of e-coins that are obtained
prior to accessing the SIP-based real-time service. These
e-coins are charged to the client’s account when she
withdraws them. That is, our protocol is based on token
and on prepayment. The client obtains e-coins from a
broker and they can be used with any vendor registered
with that broker. Thus, any entity has to carry out a
registration process with the broker to take part in the
system (see step 0 in Figure 2, hereinafter all the steps
are referred to this figure).
In the client’s registration process (step 0), the client
establishes an account that the broker uses to charge her
for the different e-coins that she will obtain (in the with-
drawal process) from the broker to make the payments.
In this process she also obtains two symmetric crypto-
graphic keys (for encryption and authentication), which
are used to communicate with the broker in a secure,
efficient way.
In the vendor’s registration process, the vendor estab-
lishes some cryptographic keys (master keys) with the
broker. The broker is responsible for increasing the bal-
ance of the vendor’s account from the e-coins the vendor
deposits.
Once the client has completed the registration process,
she has to obtain one or more e-coins from the broker in
order to be able to make purchases from the vendors
(step 1). Each e-coin that the client obtains could be used
with several vendors as long as the value of the purchases
does not exceed the value of the e-coin. This is because
during a purchase the portion of the e-coin to be paid can
be specified. The control of the amount spent is per-
formed between the broker and the vendor.
In the withdrawal request, the client can also request
keys to communicate with the vendors she wants to carry
out transactions with. In this process, the broker charges
the amount of e-coins only at this moment or the charge
could be made, at the end of some period established by
the client and the broker (at the end of the day, the week,
etc). At any subsequent moment, the client may need to
request keys for communicating with new vendors,
which is done by the client launching a vendor’s key
request (see step 2).
The payment process starts at the same time the SIP
session is initiated (step 2). Thus, the vendor requests a
payment when the client initiates a SIP session to access a
payment-based service. The payment requested could be
for the whole session or for only some amount of time or
data. Then, the client sends an e-coin to the vendor with
the amount of the e-coin she wants to pay. For example,
the e-coin value could be 1 Euro (€)/Dollar ($) and the cli-
ent could want to pay only 0.2 Euros/Dollars.
All the information exchanged in the payment phase
between the client and the vendor is protected by using
authentication and ciphering so that the information
related to the purchase cannot be modified without being
detected, and is confidential between them.
It is important to point out that a specific e-coin issued
by the broker can be used with several vendors in differ-
ent transactions. Thus, we avoid two problems of e-coins
that are issued for a specific vendor [27]. First, refunding
processes when an e-coin is not completely spent and we
are not going to perform any new transactions with a ven-
dor. Second, handling many different e-coins, if we work
with many vendors this, additionally, could suppose tidy-
ing up an important of e-money that cannot be used with
other vendors. Thanks to the possibility of defining the
portion of the e-coin to be used, we also avoid the pro-
blem of the e-coins that can be used with any vendor that
is the establishment of a connection with the broker for
each payment [27].
When the vendor (VendorX ) receives an e-coin (let us
name it e1), he checks whether he knows the amount
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spent with that e-coin and if he does not, he queries the
broker (step 3.1). With this information he can know
whether the amount paid is valid or not. If the payment
is valid then the vendor provides the client the access to
the service (step 3.2).
If the payment is for the whole session, the vendor
provides the access to the service until the session
finishes (when it has reached its end or when the client
decides to finish it). Then, step 3.4 is executed.
In contrast, if the access is only for a limited amount
of time or data, when the limit is about to be reached
the vendor either requests a new payment to continue
with the session or the session is finished. If the client
supports receiving payment requests in an established
Figure 2 Overview of the LP-SIP processes. This figure depicts an overview of the messages that are exchanged in the different processes
that LP-SIP defines.
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session a payment request with information about the
data/time remaining is sent. Thus, after step 3.2, step
3.3 is executed. This optional feature is called additional
payments. For this payment it is not required to make
any check with the broker (see step 3). Otherwise, when
the payment is not made, the session finishes (step 3.4).
Subsequent payments of new services can be made
with e-coin e1 to this same vendor during a period of
time pre-established by the broker (one day, one week,
etc, usually, in micropayments, the period is established
at one day [17,18], and this is the period that we con-
sider) with no requirement to check the amount with
the broker because the vendor can control it (see the
access to a payment-based service in step 4). Thus, we
avoid the vendor having to make many queries to the
broker, which reduces overload for the system (both for
the vendor and the broker).
On the other hand, if the e-coin e1 is used with a new
vendor (V endorY ) (step 5), this new vendor will check
the e-coin with the broker. The broker, as he knows
that is being used by another vendor (VendorX ), will
request that he indicates the last amount that the ven-
dor received as payment. Then, the broker informs the
new vendor (VendorY ) and the rest of the process is
performed as we have just explained for the payment
with a vendor for the first time.
In this description, we suppose that the payments are
made sequentially in time. Thus, the same e-coin (e1)
can be used. However, if we had to manage n different
concurrent payments, n different e-coins would have to
be used. In spite of this, the payment process would be
the same as described. The only difference is that the
e-coins used are different for each transaction (n trans-
actions, n coins). For this reason we allow the user to
request several e-coins (in the withdrawal process). Sub-
sequently, the e-coins used in these concurrent payment
transactions could also be used with the same or differ-
ent vendors in the same way we have described above.
At the end of the period established by the broker,
each vendor sends the broker the amounts of the differ-
ent e-coins he has received so that the broker can pay
the amounts into the account of each vendor.
4.3 SIP extensions to support LP-SIP protocol
This section describes the extensions we have defined in
SIP to support the LP-SIP protocol. It is important to
point out that our extensions are based on the extensibil-
ity mechanisms defined in SIP. Namely, our proposal is
based on three kinds of elements. Firstly, on the defini-
tion of new options-tags for different headers of SIP mes-
sages: Required, Supported, and Accept. Second, the
definition of a new header named LP-SIP for conveying
information related to a payment transaction. Finally, we
have defined a new type of content for the body of the
SIP messages. This new content conveys the messages
that we have defined for the different exchanges of LP-
SIP. Next, we describe each of these elements in more
detail.
4.3.1 New option-tags
Headers are used in SIP to convey different kinds of
information during the session. In general, they specify
the supported or required features by means of a list of
option-tags. For this purpose, SIP uses the Required
header in order to indicate the required features; the
Supported header to specify some additional features
that are supported; and, finally, the Accept header,
which indicates the kind of information that is sup-
ported in the exchanges. For these headers we have
defined the following option-tags:
• lpayment. This indicates that an entity supports LP-
SIP. It has been defined for the Supported header and
its use is mandatory when a payment is required. In
this situation, if a client sends an INVITE and it does
not contain it, the vendor answers with a 402 (pay-
ment required) response code.
• additionalpayment. Its use is optional and is
included in the Supported header so that the client can
indicate she supports the reception of payment
requests once the session is established. Hence, if the
vendor also supports this feature, the client will receive
a notification indicating that the amount of time or
data she paid is about to finish and that a new pay-
ment is due.
• application/lp-sip. In the Accept header it indicates
that an entity supports the exchange of the LP-SIP
messages in the body of SIP messages. This option-
tag also defines a new content-type that indicates that
the content of a SIP message is a payment message
according to our protocol.
4.3.2 LP-SIP header
We have also defined a new header for SIP messages
named LP-SIP. This new header is used in the different
messages to convey some basic information related to dif-
ferent processes that are associated to our proposal, such
as entity registration, withdrawal of e-coins, payments,
etc., (see overview in Section 4.2).
The definition of the LP-SIP header is according to the
Backus-Naur Form (BNF) notation [28] (see below). The
starting symbol is represented by LP-SIP-HEADER vari-
able. In a SIP message our header is represented with the
name LP-SIP. Basically, the header contains the kind of
exchange that is being performed. As presented above,
there are ten kinds of exchanges: Vendor Registration, Cli-
ent Registration, Vendor Key, Withdrawal, Payment
Request, Payment, Check Validity, Ecoin Notification,
Additional Payment, and Deposit. De-pending on the
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exchange, the header could also include some additional
information, e.g., in the payment request exchange (Pay-
mentRequest), we can include the different prices of the
service according to different payment models (data, time,
etc).







| “PaymentRequest;” “PID=” <identifier>
*(<modelInfo>) “Expiry=” <date>
| “Payment;” “DateTime=’ “ <dateTime> “










<modelInfo> ::= <modelId> <brokers>




<model> “unit=” <quantity> <amounts>
<modelId> ::= “modID=” <identifier>
<model> ::= “model=” <modelType>
<brokers> ::= “brokers=’” <identifier> *
(”,” <identifier>) “ ‘ “
<modelType> ::= “pay-per-time” | “pay-
per-data” | “pay-as-you-watch” | “session”
<quantity> ::= <numeric-value><unit-
tag>
<unit-tag> ::= “seg” | “min” | “h” | “Mb” |
“Kb” | “b” | “session”
<initialPayment> ::= “initialPayment;”
<amounts>
<amounts> ::= “amount=’” <amount> *(”,”




For the sake of simplicity we have not specified some
elements in the BNF notation such as identifier, which
is an alphanumerical string; numeric-value, which is a
real number; date-time, which is a string representing a
date and the time according to the extended form of
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
8601 [29]; and, amount, which is coded according to
ISO 4217 [30], which allows us to express an amount
where the quantity and the currency are coded as an
alphanumerical string.
A simple example of the LP-SIP header that would be
included in a SIP message for the payment exchange
would be the following:
LP-SIP: Payment; DateTime= ‘2010-04-
05T14:30’
This header indicates with Payment operation that the
payment is taking place and with the value of DateTime
it indicates the time when the payment is being carried
out.
4.3.3 Application/lp-sip content
The application/lp-sip content-type has been defined to
include a new type of content in the body of the SIP
messages. This content is a message associated to some
of the LP-SIP processes. These messages are defined in
Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) and we make
use of some existing structures, defined as X.509 certifi-
cates or the PKCS#7/CMS format, to convey crypto-
graphic information. The messages should be encoded
according to distinguished encoding rules and then con-
verted to its Base64 format in order to be conveyed in
the body of the SIP message.
Since we have defined that the messages are included
as a content in the body, we can combine the sending
of payment information with other kinds of data such as
text messages, images, etc.
The messages and responses codes of SIP that we use
to convey some of the messages defined in our system
are: INVITE, 183 Session in progress, PRACK, 200 OK
and MESSAGE.
5 The LP-SIP protocol specification
The notation that we have decided to use in order to
specify the sequence of messages in our protocol specifi-
cation is shown in Table 1. This notation is based on
the notation that appears in [31].
5.1 Vendor registration process
The vendor makes a registration process with the broker
in order to register the account where he wants to
receive the amounts of the e-coins he receives from cli-
ents. In this registration process the vendor also indi-
cates to the broker a pair of master keys (KEnV
BMasterKey, KSigV BMasterKey) that will be used to provide
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the clients with keys for establishing secure communica-
tion with him.
The different messages exchanged in this process are:
1. V ® B: MESSAGE (VendorRegistration-
Request)
This message denotes the vendor sends the MESSAGE
request defined in SIP. In brackets we indicate the kind
of message that we include in the body of the message
by means of the application/lp-sip content-type.
Furthermore, in the LP-SIP header we indicate the kind
of process that is being performed. We follow this con-
vention to represent the rest of the messages that will
appear throughout the article.
In this exchange, in the MESSAGE request, the vendor
includes a request for registration with the broker
(VendorRegistrationRequest). This registration process is
marked LP-SIP header as below:
LP-SIP: VendorRegistration
Moreover, the message contains in the body (indicated
with the application/lp-sip content-type):
EB(SV (V, B, VRID, KEnV BMasterKey, KSigV BMaster-
Key, VendorAccount))
where:
• V, B are the identifiers of the Vendor and Broker,
respectively. These party identifiers are the digest of
the parties’ public key and are used to avoid imper-
sonation attacks [32].
• VRID (Vendor Registration Identifier). VRID identi-
fies the registration process that is being performed
between the vendor and broker. This identifier or
label could be a randomly generated number. How-
ever, due to the importance of this process and in
order to provide a high level of security we have
decided to follow the principles proposed in [33].
These design principles recommend that the label
has the following properties: verifiability, uniqueness
and secrecy. Therefore, we have generated this iden-
tifier as H(V, B, H(KEnV BMasterKey), H(KSigV BMaster-
Key), VendorAccount).
• KEnV BMasterKey (Master Encryption Key). This is a
symmetric master key generated by the vendor that
will be used by the broker to provide the clients
with encryption keys to communicate with the ven-
dor confidentially. The default symmetric cipher to
employ is AES.
• KSigV BMasterKey (Master Signature Key). This is a
symmetric master key generated by the vendor that
will be used by the broker to provide the clients
with symmetric signature keys to guarantee the
integrity of the communication with the vendor. The
default cryptographic checksum function to employ
is hash-based message authentication code (HMAC)
[34] with SHA2 [35].
• VendorAccount. The bank account number that
the broker will use to pay the vendor the amounts
of e-coins he deposits. Each vendor has a unique
account associated, which could be changed when
needed.
This message allows the vendor to register his account
with the broker as well as the master keys that the bro-
ker will use to provide symmetric keys to the clients in
order to communicate with the vendor in a way that
guarantees authentication, integrity and confidentiality.
2. B ® V: MESSAGE (VendorRegistration-
Response)
In this message, the LP-SIP header has the same con-
tent as the previous message. In the body of the mes-
sage, the content of the VendorRegistrationResponse is:
EKVB (SB(B, V, VRID, Confirmation))
Table 1 Cryptographic notation
Notation Meaning
Data This indicates that this piece of data is optional, and may not be in the message.
H(Data) A message digest of Data, obtained using a secure hash algorithm such as SHA2 [35].
EK (Data) Data, encrypted by a symmetric cipher such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [54] using the symmetric key K.
HK (Data) Data is authenticated using a HMAC algorithm using a secure hash function such as SHA-2 with a cryptographic key K.
EK,K’
(Data)
EK (Data, HK’ (Data)). Data that is authenticated using a HMAC function with key K’ and then encrypted using a symmetric cipher using
the key K.
SX (Data) Data is signed using the private key of entity X. As a signature algorithm we could use RSA, DSA, ECDSA, etc.
EX (Data) Data, encrypted for entity X using public key cryptography (RSA) or elliptic curve cryptography–ECC–(ECDH, ECMQH, . . .). For
computational efficiency, this is implemented using either a digital envelope (in RSA) or the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) key agreement algorithm (in ECC) as specified in [55,56].
X ® Y This indicates that X sends a message to Y.
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where:
• KVB. This symmetric key is generated from KEnV
BMasterKey and broker identifier (B) in the following
way: KVB = HKEnV BMasterKey(B) .
• Confirmation. This is a flag that indicates whether
the process has been successful. This message is to
confirm whether the registration process was per-
formed successfully.
5.2 Client registration process
For a client to be able to make purchases in the sys-
tem, she has to obtain e-coins from a broker. But,
prior to this she needs to perform a registration with a
broker. In this process the user establishes the account
that will be used to charge her for the e-coins she
requests.
As a result of this registration process, the user
obtains some symmetric keys to communicate with the
vendor during the purchase process. The different mes-
sages exchanged in this process are:
1. C ® B: MESSAGE (ClientRegistration-
Request)
For this message, the content of the LP-SIP header is:
LP-SIP: ClientRegistration
In the body of this message, the ClientRegistration-
Request contains:
EB(SC (C, B, CRID, KEnkey, ClientAccount))
where:
• C, B are the identifiers of the Client and Broker,
respectively.
• CRID (Client Registration Identifier). CRID identifies
the registration process that is being performed
between client and broker. For the generation of this
identifier or label we have followed the same approach
as explained in the vendor registration process, i.e.,
CIRD=H(C, B, H(KEnkey), ClientAccount).
• KEnkey. This is a symmetric key that is generated by
the client. The key is only used to preserve the con-
fidentiality of the response message.
• ClientAccount. The client’s bank account number.
This message allows the client to send her bank
account information. In this message the client also
sends a symmetric key (KEnkey) that the broker uses to
send the response to the client.
2. B ® C: MESSAGE (ClientRegistration-
Response)
The header of LP-SIP is the same as the previous mes-
sage and in the body the content of ClientRegistration-
Response is:
EKEnkey (SB(B, C, CRID, KCB, K′CB,
Confirmation))
where:
• KCB. This encryption symmetric key is generated
from KEnC BMasterKey and client identifier (C) in the
following way: KCB = HKEnC BMasterKey(C) . KEnC BMasterKey
is a master secret key that the broker uses to derive
the different keys he will use to maintain the confi-
dentiality of the following messages between broker
and client.
• K′CB . This signature symmetric key is generated
from KSignCBMasterKey and client identifier (C) in the
following way: K ′CB = HKSignCBMasterKey(C). KSignCBMaster-
Key is a master secret key that the broker uses to
derive the different keys he will use to guarantee the
integrity and authenticity of the following messages
between broker and client.
As a response to the client’s request, the broker sends
a confirmation with two symmetric keys (KCB,K ′CB)
that will be used by the client in future communications
with the broker, e.g., for requesting an e-coin.
5.3 Withdrawal of e-coins
The client performs the withdrawal process of e-coins in
order to obtain electronic money to make the payment
of the purchases of the services she wants.
The e-coin(s) the client obtains can be used in dif-
ferent transactions and with different vendors as long
as the amount of the purchases is lower than the e-
coin value. The amount of the e-coins withdrawn are
charged to the client’s associated account that was
provided during the registration process. This charge
can be made at this very moment or at the end of
a period established between the broker and the
client.
Additionally, at the same time the user requests the e-
coins, she could request the keys that she needs to com-
municate in a secure way with the vendors.
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When a client wants to obtain some e-coins, the dif-
ferent messages exchanged in this process are:
1. C ® B: MESSAGE (WithdrawalRequest)
The LP-SIP header contains:
LP-SIP: Withdrawal
The WithdrawalRequest included in the body con-
tains:
C, EKCB(HK ′CB (C, B, WID, Amount1 [, . . . ,
Amountn], [VendorKeysReq]))
where:
• withdrawal identifier (WID). WID identifies the
withdrawal process that is being performed between
client and broker. It is generated as WID=H(C, B,
vCall-ID, Amount1[, . . . , Amountn]) using the value
of the Call-ID header (denoted as vCall-ID) included
in the message.
• Amount1 [, . . . , Amountn]. These indicate the
amounts of the different e-coins the client wants to
withdraw. Thus, for each amount indicated, the bro-
ker has to generate an e-coin of the quantity
requested. The amount is expressed according to the
ISO 4217 that indicates the quantity and the cur-
rency. The client, at least, will request an e-coin. As
an example, the user could want 3 e-coins with dif-
ferent values: one of 1 €, 1 of 1 $ and one of 3 €.
• vendor keys request (VendorKeysReq). This a list
containing the identifiers of the vendors the user
wants to communicate with. VendorKeysReq =
V1, V2, . . . , Vn.
When the broker receives the request, from the client
identifier, the broker obtains the keys the client used to
cipher and symmetrically sign the message. For this pur-
pose, the broker uses the same master keys that were
used during the client registration. If the message is cor-
rectly deciphered and the signature is valid, the broker
mints the different e-coins requested.
For each amount indicated in the request an e-coin is
generated as we show next.
e-coinX = IDX , B, Amount, C, Expiry,
HKBCoin (IDX , B, Amount, C, Expiry)
where x = 1, . . . , n (the number of e-coins)
In the e-coin, the IDX is its identifier, B is the broker’s
identifier that has minted it, the Amount indicates its
value, C indicates the client the e-coin is generated for,
and, Expiry indicates the validity of the e-coin.
This e-coin is specifically generated for a client and
she can use it with different vendors and in different
transactions as long as the value of the transactions
does not exceed its value. Moreover, the amount spent
in each transaction may be different, so we can consider
the e-coin is divisible. This e-coin can only be validated
by the broker. Later, we will explain when the broker
has to participate in a transaction.
As a response to the client request, the broker sends
the different e-coins in the following message:
2. B ® C: MESSAGE (WithdrawalResponse)
In this message, the broker includes the same LP-SIP
header as the previous message and, in its body, the
WithdrawalResponse contains:
EKCB,K ′CB (B, C, WID, e-coin1 [. . . , e-
coinn], VendorKeys)
where:
• VendorKeys. This represents the different keys the
client can use to communicate in a secure way with
the different vendors. Its value is:
V1, KCV1 , K
′
CV1 , . . . , Vn, KCVn , K
′
CVn .
Apart from the e-coins, the broker provides a set of
keys to communicate with the different vendors which
the client requested in the previous step. Later, if the
client needs keys for a new vendor, by using the keys
provided in the registration phase, she can communicate
with the broker to obtain them as we explain now.
5.4 Obtaining vendors keys
When a client wants to obtain vendor keys to communi-
cate with them, the different messages exchanged in this
process are:
1. C ® B: MESSAGE (KeyRequest)
The LP-SIP header contains:
LP-SIP: KeyRequest
The KeyRequest included in the body contains:
C, EKCB,K ′CB (C, B, KRID, VendorKeysReq)
where:
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• key request identifier (KRID). It identifies the key
request process that is being performed between cli-
ent and broker and is generated as KRID=H(C, B,
vCall-ID, VendorKeysReq)
As a response to the client request, the broker sends
the different keys in the following message:
2. B ® C: MESSAGE (KeyRequestResponse)
The body of this message contains:
EKCB,K ′CB (B, C, WID, VendorKeys)
This process can be used at any moment the user
needs to establish a new relationship with a vendor that
works with that broker. However, this process will be
used seldom since the number of vendors a user,
usually, works with is small and keys can also be
requested at the same time the user withdraws e-coins.
5.5 Purchase protocol
Of the different processes described so far, the purchase
process is the process that will be used more frequently.
This process will be executed at the same time as the
initiation of the SIP session, except for the pay-as-you-
watch model, in which the payment is made once the
session is initiated and some data is received.
When the user wants to access a payment-based ser-
vice, the messages exchanged are shown in Figure 3,
and are explained below:
1. C ® V: INVITE
The client sends this message to start the set up of the
session. The message contains an SDP description of the
session in the body. She also includes the lpayment
option-tag for the Supported header to indicate that LP-
SIP is supported. The client could also specify the addi-
tionalpayment option-tag if it supports additional pay-
ments during the session. Also, the client should include
Figure 3 LP-SIP Purchase protocol. This figure depicts in detail the messages that are exchanged in LP-SIP during the purchase process.
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the application/lp-sip in the Accept header to signal the
SIP messages that can support the exchange of the mes-
sages of the LP-SIP protocol.
2. V ® C: 183 Session in Progress
(PaymentRequest)
When the vendor receives an INVITE message, if the
service requires a payment and the lpayment option-tag
is not included in the Supported header, the vendor
returns a 402 (payment required) message.
Otherwise, the vendor returns this message with the
LP-SIP header containing a PaymentRequest indicating
the prices of accessing the service in the different curren-
cies and the models supported. The header indicates the
different models supported and for each model the initial
amount required to initiate the session and, if supported,
the different prices for the additional payments. Thus,
the LP-SIP header would be, simplified, as follows (the
whole specification is in Section 4.3.2):
LP-SIP: PaymentRequest; PID=pidv mode-
lID=mID1 brokers= ‘B’ model=modeltype
unit=quantity1 initialPayment; amounts=
‘amount1, amount2, . . . ‘ additionalpay-
ment; modelID=mID2, brokers=’B’ model=-
modeltype unit=quantity2 amounts=
’amount1, amount2, . . . Expiry=datetime
In this header payment request identifier (PID) is a
identifier of the transaction generated by the vendor and
modelID identifies the model.
In a payment request there could be different payment
models to choose (pay-per-view, pay-per-data, etc).
These models could be based on the amount of time
spent in the session (pay-per-time), on the amount of
data received (pay-per-data), etc. For each model (the
type is indicated in model and identified by modelID)
the vendor indicates the price (attribute amounts) based
on different units (attribute unit), e.g., in a pay-per-time
model the prices could be expressed in units of 5 min-
utes that cost 0.5 € each unit. With the brokers attribute
he indicates from which brokers he accepts e-coins for
the payment. This header also indicates until when this
offer is valid, by means of the Expiry attribute. Similarly,
the vendor also indicates the price of additional pay-
ments with the information included from additional-
payment attribute.
3. C ® V: PRACK (Payment)
If the client agrees to the payment, she sends the
PRACK message with the LP-SIP header indicating the
exchange is a payment. The message also contains the
payment message in its body with content-type applica-
tion/lp-sip. The client indicates the following informa-
tion in the LP-SIP header:
SIPPayment: Payment; DateTime=date-
time-value
In the content of type application/payment the follow-
ing message is included:
C, EKCV ,K ′CV (C, V, B, vCall-ID1, pidv,
date-time-value, fKey, [flowKey,] mode-
lIDY , e-coinX , Li, Ui, InfoToB)
where:
InfoToB = HK ′CB (C, V, B, IDX , date-time-
value, Li, Ui)
This message contains vCall-ID1, which indicates that
the value of Call-ID header is from message 1 (the
INVITE message) and that it is the same for all the mes-
sages of the initiation process. The pidv indicates the PID
value generated by the vendor for this transaction. The
modelIDY is chosen from the PaymentRequest message
with the e-coin. Li and Ui indicate the portion of the e-
coin that is going to be spent. The fKey is a flag that the
client can use to indicate to the vendor that, if possible,
she wants to receive the flows of the service in a ciphered
way with the key flowKey. Besides the e-coins, the mes-
sage also contains some information to the vendor to
confirm the payment with the broker (InfoToB).
In a payment, Li indicates the amount of the e-coin
that has been spent so far and Ui indicates the limit to
spend in this payment. Thus, the amount to pay in the
transaction is Ui-Li. For example, with an e-coin of 1 €,
the first time a payment is made, Li is 0 and if the
amount to pay is 0.2 €, then Ui is 0.2. In the next pay-
ment, Li will be 0.2. For the sake of simplicity, we have
included the information of one e-coin, though different
e-coins could be included if necessary. In this case, the
client would include each e-coin and its respective parts
of the e-coin to be used.
4. V ® C: 200 OK (PRACK)
With this message the vendor confirms the reception
of the e-coin. When the vendor receives the PRACK
message (message 3) with the e-coin there are two pos-
sible situations:
1. During the day the transaction is taking place,
either the vendor has received this e-coin for the first
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time or he has had it but another vendor obtained it
later. In both cases, the vendor has to contact the bro-
ker to check whether the e-coin is valid, was minted by
the broker and what portion has been spent. As a
response, the broker indicates if the e-coin is valid and
the amount that has been spent. Thus, the vendor can
calculate whether the client can use the e-coin to make
the payment.
2. The vendor has previously received an e-coin dur-
ing the day and he has not received a notification that
the e-coin is being spent with another vendor. In this
case, the vendor does not need to check with the broker
the amount spent because he knows it, since he was the
last vendor to receive a payment with that e-coin.
In the first situation, the vendor (VendorX ), before
sending a response in the message 5, has to exchange
the messages we describe next (from 4’ to 4’’’’). In the
second situation, the vendor continues the process with
message 5, explained below.
4’. V ® B: MESSAGE (CheckValidity-
Request)
The LP-SIP header for this message is:
LP-SIP: CheckValidity
The CheckValidityRequest contains:
V, EKVB,K ′VB (V, B, vCall-ID4’ , C, IDX , Li,
Ui, e-coinIDX , date-time-value,
InfoToB)
Basically, in this message the vendor sends the e-coin
to the broker with the information the broker needs to
check it. If the e-coin has not already been used during
this day, the broker checks the amount of the e-coin
spent so far and whether the amount spent is consistent
with that information, that is, the value spent has to
coincide with the valued indicated in Li. In this case, the
broker registers that the vendor is receiving a payment
with this e-coin and sends a confirmation to the vendor
with message (4’’’’ ) as shown below. Thus, the exchange
would be messages 4’ and 4’’’’ .
However, if the e-coin has already been used, the bro-
ker has to contact the previous vendor (V endorY ) to
obtain the amount spent, as we see next:
4”. B ® V’: MESSAGE (EcoinNotification-
Request)
In this message, the LP-SIP header is:
LP-SIP: EcoinNotification
The EcoinNotificationRequest contains:
B, EKV′B,K ′V′B (B, V’ , vCall-ID4’’ , IDX , C)
With this message, the broker requests the VendorY to
indicate to him the last portion of the e-coin that the
client spent with him. This information is sent in the
following message.
4"’. V’ ® B: 200 OK (EcoinNotification-
Response)
In this message, the LP-SIP header is the same as the
previous message. In the body, the EcoinNotificationRe-
sponse contains:
EKV′B,K ′V′B (V’, B, vCall-ID4”, IDX, C, Ui)
In this message the VendorY sends the last portion of
the amount that the client spent with him (U′i) . The U
′
i
value has to coincide with the initial portion of the e-
coin (Li) that the new vendor is requesting.
Both if the broker has to check with the previous ven-
dor the amount spent and if this step is not necessary,
because the broker already knows it, as a response to
the vendor request on the e-coin, the broker sends:
4"”. B® V: 200 OK
(CheckValidityResponse)
In this message, the LP-SIP header has the same value
as message 4’ . As a response, in the CheckValidityRe-
sponse, the vendor receives:
EKVB,K ′VB (B, V, vCall-ID4’ , C, Li)
With this message the vendor receives the confirma-
tion on the amount of the e-coin that has been spent
(Li). If AmountX - Li ≥ Price of the product/service, the
vendor accepts the payment and provides the access to
the product or service requested by confirming the
establishment of the session by sending message 5.
Otherwise, the vendor would send an error indicating
the payment is not valid.
Once the vendor has received this information he can
control the amount of e-money the client can use in
subsequent payments that take place in the same day.
Therefore, in the next payment, messages 4’’ and 4’’’ are
not exchanged. This is the second situation we men-
tioned.
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5. V ® C: 200 OK (INVITE)
With this message, in the header section the vendor
includes the following header:
LP-SIP: Payment; DateTime=date-time-
value, EncryptedKey=keyvalue
Thus, the vendor confirms the payment has been
received correctly. Furthermore, with this header, the
client could receive (if requested during the payment) a
key (flowkey) that will be used to cipher the session
flows that will be exchanged when the session is estab-
lished. This key is received in a ciphered way in the
EncryptedKey attribute, whose value is: keyvalue=
EKCV ,K ′CV (date-time-value, flowkey). Next, the
client acknowledges the reception and the session starts.
Thus, the client receives the access to the service.
6. C ® V: ACK
This message finishes the establishment of the SIP
session and, then, the different multimedia flows are
exchanged. This message does not need any additional
header or content.
7. C ¬® V: Multimedia information
This flow depends on the protocol and media agreed
on during this session’s establishment. The flow is
relayed until either the session finishes (messages 12
and 13) or the time/data paid for by the user is up.
When the time/data the user paid is about to finish, if
the user supports the additional payment mechanism,
messages 8-11 are exchanged. Otherwise, the session
finishes (messages 12 and 13).
8. V ® C: MESSAGE (AdditionalPayment-
Request)
This message is used by the vendor to request an
additional payment (if this mechanism is supported) to
the client when the time/data the client paid is about to
finish.
In the LP-SIP header, the vendor indicates the time or
data that rests before the session finishes with the Time-
DataStop structure. It also contains information about




brokers= ‘B’ model=modeltype unit=quan-
tity amount=amount1 Expiry=datetime
Thus, the prices could be different according to the
model (for the whole specification see Section 4.3.2).
The client sends a 200 OK as a response to this
request to confirm the reception of this message.
9. C ® V: 200 OK
This response does not contain any additional header
or content. If the client decides to continue with the
session and makes a new payment, she sends a MES-
SAGE request with the e-coin previously used with this
vendor and with a new payment portion, as long as the
remaining value of the e-coin is greater than the amount
to pay. Otherwise, the client would have to include an
additional e-coin.
10. C ® V: MESSAGE (Payment)
The content of this message is similar to message 3,
previously explained. As a response to this message, the
vendor sends the following message:
11. V ® C: 200 OK
If the payment is correctly made, the session con-
tinues during the time or the data the client has paid
for. Otherwise, the vendor sends an error message and
the session finishes (with messages 12 and 13).
This session finishes at the end of the time/data that
the session lasts or when the client is not willing to
make more payments. In both cases, the session finishes
with the following messages:
12. C ® V: BYE
This indicates the client wants to finish the session.
13. V ® C: 200 OK
The vendor confirms the reception of the message and
the session finishes.
5.6 Deposit protocol
At the end of the day, the vendor sends the broker the
amounts received from the different e-coins. Thus, the
broker can perform the deposit of value received by the
vendor. The messages exchanged are:
1. V ® B: MESSAGE (DepositRequest)
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In this message, the LP-SIP header is:
LP-SIP: Deposit
The DepositRequest contains:
V, EKVB,K ′VB (V, B, vCall-ID1, IDX1, L1, U1
[, . . . , IDXn, Ln, Un, . . . ])
With this message, the vendor indicates, for each e-
coin, the portion of the e-coin that he has received dur-
ing all the day (Li indicates the starting position and Ui
the last value received). As a response, the broker indi-
cates with the flagX value if the payment deposit has
been correctly processed for each e-coin.
2. B ® V: 200 OK (DepositResponse)
EKVB,K ′VB(V, B, vCall-ID1, IDX1, flag1 [, . .
. , IDXn, flagn, . . .])
6 Analysis of the LP-SIP protocol
In this section, we make an analysis of the LP-SIP pro-
tocol with regard to the requirements defined in Section
3 in order to show how this protocol satisfies them. We
also describe how the protocol allows us to support the
use of the case scenarios introduced in Section 2.3.
6.1 Payment protocol based on extensibility mechanisms
LP-SIP is based on the extensibility mechanisms defined
in SIP [1]. We have defined new option-tags (lpayment,
additionalpayment, application/lp-sip, Section 4.3.1) and
a new header, LP-SIP (Section 4.3.2). Thus, we facilitate
LP-SIP being supported in current implementations of
SIP and, therefore, its acceptability.
6.2 Payment models
The protocol can support different payment models:
pay-per-time, pay-per-data, session-based charging and
pay-as-you-watch. In general, these models are sup-
ported because the protocol allows us to make a pay-
ment at the beginning of the session (in the three-way
protocol combined with the PRACK method, see mes-
sages from 1 to 6 in Section 5.5) as well as at any
moment once the session is initiated (with the addi-
tional payment mechanism, see messages 8 to 11 in
Section 5.5).
In the session-based charging model the payment is
made for the whole session. Thus, there is only one pay-
ment, made at the beginning of the session.
In the pay-per-time and the pay-per-data models,
apart from a payment at the beginning of the session
(messages from 1 to 6 in Section 5.5), it is required that
a payment is made from time to time (e.g., every thirty
seconds, every minute, etc). Thus, the vendor has to
control the time/the data sent and requires a payment
once the unit of consumption (seconds or bytes) defined
is spent. These payments are requested and made by
using the additional payment feature (messages from 8
to 11 in Section 5.5).
The support of the pay-as-you-watch model is differ-
ent from the models we have just presented. In this
model, the session is initiated without a payment. Thus,
the INVITE message contains the headers indicating the
support of LP-SIP. However, the 183 Session in progress
does not contain a PaymentRequest and the PRACK
method is not necessary, with the session being initiated
on SIP as usual.
Once the session has been established and the user
has received some data (during some time) a payment
request is sent. Thus, in MESSAGE request, instead of
sending an AdditionalPaymentRequest, a PaymentRe-
quest would be sent. The payment would be received in
the 200 OK. Once the payment is made, the session
would send some additional data during some time and
a new payment request would be sent. All payments
after the initial payment are requested using the Addi-
tionalPaymentRequest message.
Thus, thanks to the possibility of making payments
both at the beginning of the session and once it is
initiated, our proposal supports different payment
models.
6.3 Additional payments
As shown throughout the article, LP-SIP supports mak-
ing additional payments once the session is initiated.
For this purpose and based on the SIP extensibility
mechanisms, LP-SIP extends the MESSAGE request and
the 200 OK response in order to support the request
and send additional payments without interrupting the
session. Thus, we can support different models, as men-
tioned in the previous section.
6.4 Time/data notification
In order for the user to be aware of the remaining time
paid associated to the session, the LP-SIP protocol noti-
fies users via the additional payments feature. Thus, at
the same time the time is notified, a new payment is
requested (if required). Therefore, we satisfy the time/
data notification requirement.
6.5 Lightweight and efficient protocol
To support real-time payments, the protocol has to be
lightweight and efficient. For this purpose, the purchase
process has been designed using symmetric cryptogra-
phy (encryption based on a symmetric algorithm, such
as AES, and signature based on HMAC with a secure
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hash function, such as SHA-2), which is much more
lightweight than asymmetric cryptography. We have also
avoided the broker having to participate in the transac-
tion for every payment. Furthermore, our protocol is
more lightweight than previous studies, as presented in
Section 8. Therefore, LP-SIP can be considered light-
weight and efficient.
6.6 Security analysis
In this section we provide an analysis of the different
properties that the protocol satisfies in terms of security.
The main objective of the payment system is to provide
security and efficiency during the highly used payment
phase. As mentioned in the previous section, security is
provided by means of symmetric cryptography. In other
processes where there is no previous contact between
entities, such as client and vendor registration processes,
the asymmetric encryption and digital signatures are
used. In this system there are two possible kind of
attackers: internal and external.
On the one hand, external attackers of the transaction
such as other entities that compete in the system as
other brokers, vendors or clients (whose aim is for an
entity to have a bad reputation and thus, the number of
its users would be reduced in benefit of another entity
in the system, e.g., a vendor could change the informa-
tion exchanged between a client and another vendor so
that the client has to pay more quantity for the product
and the vendor could be seen to be cheating the client)
or any other entity that wanted to obtain benefits from
the payment transaction.
On the other hand, internal attackers of the transac-
tion, i.e., the client, and the vendor (the broker is con-
sidered a trusted party) could aim to obtain more
benefits fraudulently from the transactions, e.g., the cli-
ent trying to re-use an e-coin already spent to obtain
new content, etc. In our justification of security proper-
ties, instead of referring to them as internal attackers we
will mention them by name in order to distinguish
between the attacks that the client can try from those of
the vendor.
In the following sections, we analyze in more detail
the security properties and how we can avoid the differ-
ent attacks that clients, vendors and external attackers
(or simply attackers) can try to carry out.
6.6.1 Integrity and authentication
The integrity of all the messages is guaranteed by differ-
ent mechanisms: in the vendor and client registration
processes by means of digital signatures, and in the
withdrawal and deposit of e-coins and in the purchase
process by means of HMAC checksums. Thus, any
change made by an external attacker to the messages of
the transaction will be detected by the entities partici-
pating in the system.
In the transactions where a digital signature is used
(registration processes), the recipient can be sure that
nobody except the sender has signed the message. Thus,
this digital signature guarantees non-repudiation.
In the messages where symmetric signature based on
HMAC is used (withdrawal, purchase and deposit pro-
cesses), although the signing key is shared between the
entities, the recipient can be sure that the message
comes from the other party (if we suppose that the sen-
der has not revealed his/her key to another party, since
this is against his/her own interests). With this sym-
metric signature, non-repudiation is not guaranteed but
it is not required, since the purpose is to guarantee that
the information cannot be produced by an external
attacker. Non-repudiation is analyzed in more detail
below.
6.6.2 Replay attacks
An external attacker could copy a message exchanged
between the client and the vendor and he could re-send
it later in order to try to obtain the access to the service
or that the client is charged more than once. However,
if that attacker re-sends an old message the vendor will
detect that the current identifier contained in the mes-
sage for the transaction (PID value) does not match
with the current transaction and that the e-coin and the
amount indicated in the message has been already spent.
Furthermore, if the vendor has previously received the
e-coin, he knows the portion of the e-coin spent and he
can check that this portion has already been spent. If
the vendor does not know this information, he will
query the broker. Therefore, the vendor can detect if
the payment was made and in this case, the vendor will
not charge the client and will not provide access to the
service.
6.6.3 Confidentiality
In the LP-SIP protocol, we have used both symmetric
and asymmetric cipher algorithms to ensure the confi-
dentiality of the information exchanged. In the different
messages, we have, as far as possible, used symmetric
cryptography for the sake of efficiency. This is especially
interesting in the purchase process since this will be used
most frequently. In this process the real-time require-
ments are fundamental so that access to real-time ser-
vices is provided seamlessly. It is also used in other
processes such as the withdrawal and deposit of e-coins.
Furthermore, in the event the user considers that the
information contained in the flow should not be eaves-
dropped by external attackers, she can request the ven-
dor to cipher the communication with a symmetric key
as well. This key is received during the purchase process
in a secure way. Therefore, supposing perfect cryptogra-
phy, the content of the flow cannot be accessed by an
external attacker unless the key is revealed by the ven-
dor or client.
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As symmetric cipher we propose AES because since it
was introduced no significant security problems have
been revealed. In those cases where there had been no
previous contact between the entities (client and vendor
registration processes), it is necessary to use asymmetric
cryptography.
Therefore, as all the communications are ciphered and
if we suppose perfect cryptography, no external attacker
can eavesdrop the information exchanged between the
different parties.
6.6.4 Key distribution
The broker is the entity responsible for distributing to
the clients, the keys that they will use to communicate
with vendors. This distribution can be made in two dif-
ferent processes: when the user withdraws e-coins (see
Section 5.3) or at any moment after registration with
the key request process (see Section 5.4).
In both processes the communication between the
user and the broker is ciphered with the keys that the
broker generated and distributed to the client
(KCB,K ′CB) . These keys are only known by them and
unless one of them reveals them, no external attacker
can eavesdrop the vendors’ keys the client obtains.
Thus, if we suppose perfect cryptography for the keys
used in AES algorithm for ciphering and HMAC-SHA-2
for integrity, the information exchanged cannot be
accessed by an external attacker.
Another possible attack that the client could try is to
obtain the vendor’s master key in order to eavesdrop
other communications between the vendor and other
clients. There are two possible ways to obtain it. First,
by eavesdropping the vendor’s registration process, since
in this process the vendor sends master keys to the bro-
ker. However, the communication is ciphered. Second,
from a client key, calculating the master key by brute
force or finding collisions in the hash function (SHA-2)
used in the HMAC. But these attacks are not possible if
we suppose perfect cryptography.
6.6.5 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation aims to provide the evidences needed
in the event that a party (client or vendor) denies his/
her participation in a transaction or having received the
content. This feature is fundamental when the amounts
involved in the transactions are large. However, as men-
tioned in [36,37], in purchase transactions where it is
expected that the amounts involved will be small or
very small (micropayments) as in our payment system,
non-repudiation could be considered unnecessary in
order to save some computations and perform the
transactions more efficiently.
As in most micropayment schemes, the model is
based on the fact that the amount involved in the trans-
actions is (very) small. Therefore, the profit the vendor
can obtain by cheating the user (not providing the
access to the service or content) is very low and the
consequence would be that he would obtain a bad repu-
tation, which could suppose that no new customers
decide to make purchases with him [5], as well as the
broker possibly deciding to drop the vendor from the
system. At the same time, the broker can check the
amounts spent by each customer and control if a user is
making frequent complaints to avoid the payment, in
this case the user will be dropped from the system.
In the event of non-repudiation being needed, the
purchase protocol could be extended by substituting the
“signature” based on HMAC by an electronic signature
based on public-key cryptography or using S/MIME
headers to sign the SIP messages [38,39].
In registration and vendor keys, non-repudiation is
guaranteed so that the broker can prove to the entity
that manages client and vendor accounts (if it is not
itself) that the client and/or vendor really provided him
her/his account.
6.6.6 Bogus e-coin
The e-coins are only generated and verified by the bro-
ker. Therefore, unless an (internal or external) attacker
knows the keys used to mint the e-coins, it is not possi-
ble to use bogus e-coins.
Each e-coin is protected by using a symmetric key that
depends on the client identifier. If we suppose perfect
cryptography, an (internal or external) attacker cannot
obtain the key associated to generate e-coins for a parti-
cular client. As an additional control measure, the bro-
ker could control the serial numbers generated for the
different clients in order to detect a possible attack on
the key used to generate e-coins for a client. In this
case, the identifier will be drawn.
Even if an (internal or external) attacker has managed
to obtain the key for a client (not possible under the
conditions we have just explained), if he wanted to gen-
erate e-coins for a different client, he would have to
obtain the broker’s master key. But this attack is not
possible if we suppose perfect cryptography and it can
also be detected in the same way as we have just men-
tioned for a particular client master key.
6.6.7 Double spending/overspending
Double spending/overspending is an attack that the cli-
ent can try during the payment process. The control of
whether an e-coin is double spent or not is performed
between the broker and the vendors.
The first time a vendor receives the e-coin from the
client he has to contact the broker in order to ascertain
if the e-coin is valid and the total amount of the e-coin
that has been spent. The broker checks, from its serial
number, if the e-coin is being used with another vendor
and in that case checks the amount spent with that
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vendor. He also notifies that vendor that the e-coin is
going to be used with another vendor.
As a result of this process, the broker provides the
new vendor the amount of e-coin that has been spent.
Thus, the vendor can check if the amount to pay has
already been used or not. Subsequent payments in a
short period of time (established by the broker, usually a
day) will be controlled by the vendor until he receives a
notification from the broker indicating that the e-coin is
going to be used with another vendor.
In order to limit the validity of a serial number of an
e-coin, each e-coin incorporates an expiry date. Thus,
the broker can also check if an e-coin that was used a
long time ago is valid or not.
6.6.8 Double deposit/over deposit
In a similar way as the client can try to double spend an
e-coin, the vendor could try to deposit the same e-coin
with the broker several times. Thus, the vendor would
receive more money in his account. However, the broker
can control this situation thanks to the identifier con-
tained in the e-coin as well as the information about the
portion of the e-coin spent in previous transactions.
Each time the broker receives a deposit, he obtains the
identifiers of each e-coin as well as the portion of the e-
coin deposited (Li - Ui). Then, for each e-coin, he
checks that the e-coin has not expired and that portion
has not been spent yet (for each e-coin the broker stores
the last portion spent–Ui–until the e-coin expires). If
the verification is successful, the broker updates his
information and pays in the amount to the vendor’s
account. Otherwise, the attack is detected. The broker
only stores information on e-coins that have not
expired. Thus, we limit the information that the broker
has to store.
The vendor could also try to charge more money than
he actually received, e.g., a vendor (let’s say VendorX )
that should charge 0.3 € from a 1 €e-coin could request
from the broker a payment of 0.9 €. This attack may be
performed in the deposit process by changing the limits
the vendor sends to the broker, e.g., VendorX could
send 0 as Li and 0.9 as Ui. If the e-coin was used with
more vendors during the day, the broker will detect the
over deposit because he will see that intervals received
by the different vendors for the same e-coin are overlap-
ping. The broker can also know, previous to the deposit
process, the amount to pay to each vendor if each time
there is a change in the vendor that is receiving the e-
coin he registers the amount spent with each vendor.
Thus, the broker can make a double check. Continuing
with the example we have just mentioned, if the client
uses the same e-coin with VendorY to make a payment
of 0.4 €, he would send to the vendor 0.3 as Li and 0.7
as Ui. Then, at the end of the day when the broker
receives the two deposits he will see that the e-coin
interval of VendorX (0-0.9) overlaps with the e-coin
interval of VendorY (0.3-0.7). Therefore, one of them is
trying to make an over deposit.
In order to determine which vendor is cheating, the
broker would request the InfoToB token (see message 3
in Section 5.5) that the client sends to the vendor when
he makes a payment. This token confirms the amount
to be paid to the vendor in the transaction and this
information cannot be modified by the vendor since it is
signed using a symmetric key shared only between the
client and the broker. Thus, from the InfoToB token
received from each vendor, the broker can detect the
vendor that is cheating.
6.6.9 Visibility
In a payment protocol, some of the data exchanged
must be readable by only those parties needing this
information to accomplish their tasks, e.g., vendor
account number should be protected from the client,
and likewise, the broker does not need to know the ser-
vices the user is accessing, etc. Hence, this feature is to
guarantee confidentiality (see Section 6.6.3) and not
include more information than necessary in the
messages.
As mentioned, the LP-SIP protocol uses asymmetric
encryption and electronic signature to protect this par-
tially confidential information from unintended readers
and symmetric encryption based on AES and crypto-
graphic checksums based on HMAC to exchange e-
coins. Thus, the information exchanged in the payment
system during the client registration phase and the with-
drawal e-coin phase can be seen only by the client and
broker. In a similar way, in the processes of vendor
registration, check validity and deposit, the information
is only seen between vendor and broker.
In the payment phase, the information exchanged can
be seen only by the client, vendor and broker. No other
party can see it. Furthermore, the protocol for the ven-
dor, in the queries or in the deposit to the broker does
not include information on the services the user is
accessing. The broker knows only the different relation-
ships established between the entities. The vendor can-
not know the other vendors the e-coin has been used
with since the e-coin does not contain this information
and the interval does not provide this information. He
cannot know the client’s account either. This informa-
tion is known only by the broker. Therefore, the vendor
cannot obtain it if we suppose that broker behaves as a
TTP.
In the event that client and vendor want to reduce the
visibility of the information even more so that the bro-
ker cannot see it, they could use the messages of a pay-
ment either to transport a key transport protocol (the
client could send a symmetric key encrypted with the
public key of the vendor) or perform a key agreement
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exchange, negotiating other symmetric keys to perform
the payment exchange or use an SSL/TLS channel or
IPsec [38,39].
The problem of using network/transport level
mechanisms (TLS, IPsec, etc) is that the protection end-
to-end is not guaranteed when there are intermediaries
in the SIP communication [40]. So, when a intermediary
entity does not use it, the client and vendor identities
are exposed and could be profiled. Several solutions to
preserve privacy in SIP have been proposed [1,40-43].
From the solutions to preserve privacy in SIP the right
choice is to use PrivaSIP [40,42,43] when both the pro-
tection of the user identity and authentication are
required [40]. Otherwise, the use of Anonymous URI [1]
is recommended [40]. Apart from using these solutions
in LP-SIP we should replace parties’ identifiers with
pseudonyms.
In LP-SIP, the mechanism of Anonymous URI
involves the use of an anonymous URI like “sip:anon-
ymous@anonymous.invalid” in the SIP <From >header
replacing client’s identity. When authentication is
required and we want to preserve both client and ven-
dor identity with PrivaSIP we have to encrypt the cli-
ent’s identity and replace the display name by the string
“anonymous” in the <From >header, replace the <Con-
tact >header with the IP address of the client and
encrypt the vendor’s identity.
6.6.10 Formal analysis
Apart from the analysis of the different security proper-
ties of the protocol we have made in the previous sec-
tion, we decided to check them by means of a formal
analysis tool. We carried out a formal validation of the
different protocols and sub-protocols proposed using
the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols
and Applications (AVISPA) tool [44,45]. It is important
to point out that this tool allows us to check most of
previous properties that are related to the secure
exchange of information (the properties that are
checked with this tool are detailed below. As far as we
know, the checking of the properties related to privacy
or payment such as double spending, bogus e-coins, etc
is not supported). Thus, thanks to this tool, we can
assert that the analysis made in previous sections is
accurate.
In AVISPA, the validation process is the following.
First, we specify our protocol in the High Level Protocol
Specification Language (HLPSL) [46]. The notation is
similar to the one we have used in the specification of
the protocol. The main difference is the way in which
the different cryptographic operations are denoted.
Furthermore, we specify the different elements that are
used in the validation of authentication and secrecy
goals. Then, the AVISPA tool translates it into the
Intermediate Format (IF) specification [44,45]. Finally,
this IF specification is analyzed by invoking state-of-the-
art back-ends that this tool provides, which are cur-
rently: On-the-Fly Model Checker (OFMC) [45,47],
Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe)
[45,48] SAT-based Model Checker (SATMC) [49], and
Tree Automata-based Protocol Analyzer (TA4SP) [50].
These back-ends allow us to check a set of automatic
analysis techniques, such as protocol falsification or
abstraction-based verification.
Specifically, AVISPA allows us to check, from the spe-
cification of LP-SIP in HLPSL, if the machine of the LP-
SIP protocol is correctly designed (non-deterministic
protocols), and the following properties: replay attacks,
confidentiality, impersonation, secrecy and authentica-
tion. Furthermore, the back-ends of this tool follow the
standard Dolev-Yao model, in which the intruder is
assumed to have control over the network.
This specification has been tested with the different
back-ends mentioned above. As a result, these back-
ends return attacks (if any). In our case, we have verified
the properties previously mentioned successfully. The
specification of the purchase process according to
AVISPA is available in [51].
6.7 Support of the use case scenarios
In this section we analyze how the use case scenarios
introduced in Section 2.3 are supported.
For scenario 1, both caller and callee have to play the
role of client and vendor. In this scenario, the first time
a caller calls a callee, she makes a payment according to
the flow of messages from 1 to 6 presented in Section
5.5 (hereinafter all the messages refer to that section).
Thus, the caller behaves as a client and the callee as a
vendor. Once the payment is made, the callee includes
the caller in a whitelist and the call takes place. If the
call is not spam, prior to finalizing the session, the
callee, behaving as a vendor, sends a payment request
according to the flow of messages from 8 to 11 depicted
in Section 5.5. Then, the session finishes with messages
12 and 13.
In scenario 2, a company can provide real-time ser-
vices according to different business models such as
pay-per-time, pay-per-data, session-based or pay-as-you-
watch. When the client wants to access these services
by initiating an LP-SIP session, the vendor informs
about the different models supported and the prices
associated by means of the PaymentRequest sent in the
183 Session in progress answer (message 2). From this
message, the flow is different, depending on the model.
In the session-charged model, the client makes a pay-
ment with message 3 and messages 4-6 are exchanged
to finish the establishment of the session. Once the ses-
sion is established the client accesses the real-time ser-
vice (messages represented in step 7) until the session
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finishes with messages 12 and 13. In this model, the
only payment made is at the beginning of the session.
In the pay-per-time or pay-per-data model, the session
is initiated as in the previous model, then, the client
accesses the real-time service for some time (e.g., 30 s)
or some amount of data (e.g., 300 Kb). The control of
the time and data is controlled by the vendor. When the
time/data paid is about to finish, the vendor sends the
request for an additional payment so that the client can
access the service for some additional time or amount
of data. Thus, messages 8 and 9 are exchanged. If the
client agrees to continue with the session, she sends a
new payment with messages 10 and 11. The flow of
messages from 8 to 11 will be repeated each time the
amount of time/data paid is about to finish and the user
is willing to continue with the session. Otherwise, the
session finishes with messages 12 and 13.
In the pay-as-you-watch model the approach is differ-
ent to the model we have just described. In this model,
instead of paying before receiving some data, the pay-
ment is made once the user has received some amount
of data. Thus, in this model, the session is initiated
without requesting any payment using the SIP three-way
protocol. The only information included is the option-
tags related to the LP-SIP protocol and defined for the
Required and Supported headers, that is, lpayment and
additionalpayments (see Section 4.3.1).
Once the session is initiated, after some data have
been sent to the client, the vendor requests a payment.
This payment is requested by using messages 8 and 9,
but instead of an AdditionalPaymentRequest, a Paymen-
tRequest is sent. If the client agrees to the payment,
then, in messages 10 and 11, the payment is sent. Subse-
quent payments in the session are requested using mes-
sages 8 and 9 with AdditionalPaymentRequest and
making payment with messages 10 and 11. Thus, the
session continues while the client is making payments.
Otherwise, the session finishes with messages 12 and 13.
Scenario 3 is similar to scenario 2 when the pay-per-
time is followed. Thus, there is an initial payment dur-
ing the initiation of the session for the establishment of
the call. Then, once the session is initiated, an additional
payment is requested each minute in order to continue
with the call.
As we have explained in this section, thanks to the
different mechanisms and the information exchanged in
LP-SIP, the LP-SIP supports the use of different pay-
ment models.
7 Related study
There are two kind of mechanisms for charging SIP ser-
vices: those that are based on accounting and those
based on SIP-based payment mechanisms such as Fischl
and Tschofenig’s proposal [5], SIMPA [6], SIPCoin [7],
Fan’s et al. protocol [8], or Zhang’s et al. protocol [9].
In general, accounting mechanism has been used for
charging these services since it is based on infrastruc-
tures that were already deployed by network operators
and service providers. Particularly, these accounting sys-
tems are based on AAA infrastructures. In these infra-
structures the most used protocols are RADIUS and
Diameter, although Diameter seems to be the choice in
the establishment of new AAA infrastructures since it
fixes RADIUS deficiencies [3]. However, Diameter has
some vulnerabilities that mean that the accounting
information might be not valid or accurate. As a
response to these vulnerabilities SIPA Diameter applica-
tion was proposed to offer a fully fledged accounting
solution for SIP, which provides proper billing for
services.
These solutions that are based on AAA can provide in
an efficient way subscription-based service access type,
but not pay-per-use service access type, since they
require the credit-server to participate in each payment
and the service fee calculation requires contacting
another entity, such as the credit-control client or the
credit-control server, unlike a (micro)payment solution
where the service provider can calculate the fee without
contacting another entity [10]. These drawbacks hinder
the use of accounting systems for paying in an efficient
and scalable way for real-time payment services in SIP.
This is proved by the comparison between Diameter SIP
application and Diameter credit-control application with
a micropayment protocol as SIPCoin [10], which in
turn, we improve.
Micropayments are the ideal mechanism for paying for
(very) small amounts [13,17,18] since they are designed
to be lightweight and can be used to pay for real-time
based services [7,10]. In general, micropayments can be
classified into token-based or account-based [20]. In
token-based systems, a token or e-coin is used to make
payments. Later, when the broker receives the token, he
pays the vendor. In an account-based system, the custo-
mers authorize the transfer of e-money from the client’s
account to the vendor’s account.
In order to support (micro-)payments in SIP we could
consider integrating some of the existing payment pro-
tocols in SIP (either token-based or account-based).
However, if we review the latest micropayment proto-
cols defined [14-16], these have not considered the
secure exchange of payment information or if they have
defined it, they use asymmetric cryptography. Further-
more, although many have reduced the number of
asymmetric operations in the purchase process, they still
use some asymmetric operations in this process (asym-
metric cryptography is about 100 times slower than the
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symmetric one [52]). Furthermore, some of them
require the management of different tokens at the same
time [15], which increases transaction costs [13].
Apart from this possible integration, there are several
proposals that consider payment in SIP. These propo-
sals, which are designed to make the payment in SIP are
[6-9,12]. From these proposals we can point out that
[5,6,8,9,11] are not suitable for making micropayments
since a third party participates in each payment and
asymmetric cryptography is used, which also involves
certificates, verifications [53] and increased transactions
costs [13]. Therefore, they are not suitable for making
real-time micropayments.
On the other hand, Hao et al.’s [7] proposal, named SIP-
Coin, is token-based, namely in hash-chains in order to be
able to make payments efficiently. Their goal was to define
a micropayment protocol based on the ideas of previous
micropayment proposals but avoiding asymmetric crypto-
graphy. Thus, the micropayment could be made very
quickly and real-time payment could be supported.
In SIPCoin, in each transaction (but not in each pay-
ment) a third party (a payment provider) participates to
generate the hash chain to be used and the hash chain
used is different; therefore, unspent hash chains are not
reused. We can also mention that they do not define
how to exchange payment information in a secure way
that guarantees authentication, confidentiality and integ-
rity, although they mention that mechanisms such as S/
MIME, TLS and SIPS URI could be used for this pur-
pose. In fact, at least one of these mechanisms should
be used since, if not, the vendor could eavesdrop on the
communication and obtain the root used to generate
the hash chain and thus receive a payment of higher
value than that specified by the vendor.
LP-SIP, as SIPCoin, is based on a token and is suitable
for making micropayments since the payment phase is
based on symmetric cryptography and a third party does
not participate in all the payments, which is desirable to
reduce attacks and costs [13]. We have also considered
the secure exchange of payment information by using
symmetric cryptography in order to guarantee authenti-
cation, confidentiality and integrity in a more efficient
way than S/MIME or TLS, which require asymmetric
cryptography, which is computationally less efficient
than symmetric cryptography. Furthermore, we have
reduced the participation of a third party in the pay-
ment. In the following section we compare SIPCoin and
LP-SIP in more detail.
8 Comparison with previous work
We compare in depth LP-SIP with SIPCoin proposal
since from previous study this is the only proposal that
could be considered for making real-time micropay-
ments for access to multimedia services based on SIP.
We analyze both proposals for the number of messages
exchanged between the different parties (C - Client, V -
Vendor, B - Broker or Payment provider) during the pay-
ment phase and for the different cryptographic operations
involved to make the payment. This information is shown
in Table 2.
For comparison we have considered two cases. First,
when a client makes a payment to access the whole ses-
sion. Thus, the client makes the payment, the session is
established, the service is provided and once the service
is finished, the session ends. This case is named basic
payment and appears in Table 2 as row A. Second, a cli-
ent makes an initial payment for a part of the session;
the session starts and after some time/amount of data
an additional payment is requested to continue with the
session. If the user decides to continue with the session,
the client makes a new payment and the session con-
tinues for some additional time/amount of data. After
this, a new payment could be requested or the session
could finish. This case is named session with additional
payments and appears in row B. For simplicity, in the
comparison we suppose that only one additional pay-
ment is requested before finishing the session.
As shown in Table 2 there are two columns for LP-SIP.
LP-SIP1 is the case when the client contacts a vendor for
the first time in a day (this case is also applicable if the cli-
ent has also previously used the e-coin in the same day
with another vendor). LP-SIP2 is the case when the client
has already made a payment with that vendor using the
same e-coin and without having used it with another
vendor.
In Table 2 we can also see that for SIPCoin the number
of hash operations is expressed according to N, X, and I.
This is because the payment in SIPCoin is made from a
hash chain. When the client starts a transaction, the bro-
ker generates a hash chain of SIPCoins. Let us suppose
the hash chain has a value of 1 €and that each hash value
(SIPCoin) in the chain has a value of 0.1 €. In this
Table 2 Comparison based on the number of messages
and cryptographic operations
SIPCoin LP-SIP1 LP-SIP2
C V B C V B C V B
Messages sent 5 4 4 4 6 2 4 4
Message received 5 4 4 4 5 2 4 3
A Symmetric encryption 1 3 4 1 1
HMAC 2 3 5 2 1
Hash X+N X N
Messages sent 7 6 6 8 6 6
Message received 7 6 6 7 6 5
B Symmetric encryption 2 4 2 2
HMAC 4 4 4 2
Hash N+X+(I-X) X+(I-X) N
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situation, the length of the chain is 10 (N) and this is the
number of initial hashes the user has to make to verify
the chain received. Later, for the initial payment, let us
suppose that it is 0.3 €, the user would calculate the hash
from the root value that he received for the chain. In this
case the number of hashes would be 3 (X). Later, let us
suppose an additional payment of 0.2 €is required, then
the total number of hashes would be 5 (I where I ≤ N)
and for this additional payment the number of hashes
performed are 2 (I - X).
From this comparison we can draw several conclusions.
First, LP-SIP reduces the participation of a third party
like a broker or payment provider. It is also important to
point out that in SIPCoin the broker has to participate in
all transactions (only for the first payment) unlike LP-SIP
where the participation of the broker is only required the
first time a user makes a payment with the broker during
the day or when the user uses the same e-coin with dif-
ferent vendors. If the e-coin is used several times with
the same vendor, broker participation is only required
the first time. Thus, payments can be made more effi-
ciently and the broker does not become a bottleneck on
account of multiple transactions from many vendors and
clients.
Second, the number of symmetric operations needed to
guarantee authentication, confidentiality and integrity in
LP-SIP is reduced. SIPCoin proposes them as an addi-
tional feature by means S/MIME, which supposes the use
of asymmetric cryptography, or SSL/TLS that requires
the use of asymmetric and symmetric cryptography with
the exchange of additional messages (at least five mes-
sages to establish the channel and, if client authentication
is established, two asymmetric signatures and one asym-
metric encryption are required). But if these mechanisms
are not used, a vendor could eavesdrop on the communi-
cation, obtain the root value to generate the hash chain
and, in this way could calculate additional e-coins that he
will be paid. As this feature is not an integral part of SIP
these operations have not been included in the table but
we should take into account their cost (in messages and
cryptographic operations as mentioned above) in the
comparison. Thus, we can assert that we support authen-
tication, confidentiality, and integrity efficiently.
Third, the number of operations in LP-SIP is indepen-
dent of the amount to pay, unlike SIPCoin, which
depends on the value of the e-coins that are part of the
hash chain. In SIPCoin, all the e-coins of a hash chain
have the same value. Therefore, the divisibility is more
difficult to achieve (as a solution to this problem the
value of the e-coins could be very low, e.g., 0.01 but this
would suppose many hash operations to make a pay-
ment of 1 €) unlike our protocol, where we can specify
the exact amount to pay.
Fourth, particularly for vendors, the support of our
protocol is efficient since the number of symmetric
operations is reduced (in the worst case, the number of
symmetric operations is 8), unlike SIPCoin, as we have
just mentioned, which depends on the value of e-coins
of the hash chain and does not offer additional features
that we support like authentication, integrity and confi-
dentiality of payment information, and its provision with
S/MIME or SSL/TLS would be more costly. Thus, in
LP-SIP, vendors could also support many different
transactions with many different clients at the same
time.
Finally, from the analysis of the number of messages
and the operations to perform we can conclude LP-SIP
offers divisibility, better security properties (including
them efficiently) and reduced participation of the broker
compared to SIPCoin, which makes it suitable for mak-
ing real-time payments.
9 Conclusions and future work
SIP is one of the most important protocols to establish
(multimedia) sessions and its use has even spread to
mobile communications. Due to this, the extension of
SIP to support payments is considered as a very inter-
esting idea to charge users for the real-time services
that a services provider offers. In fact, several proposals
have appeared to support payments on SIP, such as
SIMPA or SIPCoin. However, some of these proposals
are not suitable for making payment for access to low-
value services that have to be paid in real-time.
From these proposals, SIPCoin could be considered
suitable for the above purpose. However, this proposal
does not take into account as an integral part of the
protocol properties such as authentication, confidenti-
ality and integrity of payment information. For this
purpose, SIP security mechanisms such as S/MIME,
SSL/TLS or SIPS URI could be used. However, this
increases the use of asymmetric cryptography during
the payment phase, which is not suitable for very effi-
cient payments.
As a response to the need for a payment protocol for
the access to real-time services in SIP that considers the
authentication, confidentiality and integrity of payment
information, we have proposed LP-SIP. This new proto-
col is based on SIP extensibility mechanisms, which can
facilitate its adoption. Furthermore, our proposal also
reduces the participation of a third party such as a bro-
ker or a payment provider, which makes it better for
making micropayments for access to real-time services.
Future work will focus on studying whether it is possi-
ble to reduce the participation of the broker even more
or whether we can design more lightweight primitives
for the operations performed in the protocol.
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